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aBstraCt
Computer forensics is the discipline that deals with the acquisition, investigation, preservation, and pre-
sentation of digital evidence in the court of law. Whereas antiforensics is the terminology used to describe 
malicious activities deployed to delete, alter, or hide digital evidence with the main objective of manipulating, 
destroying, and preventing the creation of evidence. Various antiforensic methodologies and tools can be 
used to interfere with digital evidence and computer forensic tools. However, memory-based antiforensic 
techniques are of particular interest because of their effectiveness, advanced manipulation of digital evidence, 
and attack on computer forensic tools. These techniques are mainly performed in volatile memory using 
advanced data alteration and hiding techniques. For these reasons memory-based antiforensic techniques 
are considered to be unbeatable. This article aims to present some of the current antiforensic approaches 
and in particular reports on memory-based antiforensic tools and techniques.
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IntroduCtIon
The advent of information technology and per-
sonal computers has transformed significantly 
our way of living. Most of our day-to-day ac-
tivities rely heavily upon the use of electronic 
devices and digital communications. More 
people are relying on these technologies to learn, 
work, and entertain. In 2003, the USA Census 
Bureau estimated that 62% of the households 
had access to a personal computer while 55% 
had access to the Internet (Census Bureau, 
2003). Without doubt, digital communications 
can be considered as one of the greatest inven-
tions of the last century because of its impact 
and benefits on the society.
On the other hand, digital communications 
have provided new opportunities for crimi-
nals and shaped the ways they commit crime 
(Shinder, 2002). Criminals are now exploiting 
digital communications to commit a wide range 
of crimes such as identity theft, online piracy, 
financial fraud, terrorism, and pornography 
distribution. Furthermore the incidences of 
some of types of crimes increased significantly 
with the introduction of digital communications 
and personal computers. For example, Internet 
communications have escalated the problem of 
child pornography by increasing the amount of 
material available, the efficiency of its distribu-
tion, and the ease of its accessibility (Wortley 
& Smallbone, 2004). 
According to Bruce Schneier, electronic 
crime is flourishing because of three main rea-
sons: a) automation, b) action at distance, and 
c) technique propagation (Schneier, 2000). 
a. Automation: Software packages are used to 
perform repetitive tasks and cross reference 
more and more data.
b. Action at distance: We live in a global 
digital communication era. Criminals 
perform electronic crimes in distance and 
with a high rate of anonymity.
c. Technique propagation: Successful elec-
tronic crime techniques and malicious 
software is propagated easily through the 
Internet.
Law enforcement agencies have started 
dealing with crimes involving electronic devices 
and communications since the 1970s when 
these technologies were introduced. These were 
coined as electronic crimes since electronic 
devices and digital communications were used 
to commit them; while electronic evidence was 
defined as information or data of investigative 
value that are stored or transmitted by electronic 
devices (Ashcroft, 2001). 
Law enforcement investigators initially 
considered electronic evidence as any other type 
of evidence; however they realised soon that 
this was not the case and that the conventional 
approach was not suitable to collect, preserve, 
and analyse electronic evidence. This is because 
‘conventional evidence lives in an analog world, 
whereas computer-derived evidence comes 
from a digital world and the transition between 
these worlds is not always as smooth as one 
would hope’ (Johansson, 2002).
Computer forensics was then established 
as a discipline to support law enforcement 
agencies in their fight against electronic crime. 
Computer forensics deals with the acquisition, 
investigation, preservation, and presentation of 
digital evidence in the court of law with the final 
objective of finding evidence that would lead to 
prosecution. Computer forensics is also known 
as cyber forensics since it deals with crimes com-
mitted in the cyber world (electronic world). The 
main areas of searching for evidence are hard 
drives, removable devices, volatile memory, 
deleted or hidden files, password protected files, 
pornographic material, and so forth.
The most important input of a computer 
forensic investigation is the digital evidence. 
Digital evidence can be envisaged as the coun-
terpart of fingerprints or DNA in the digital 
world. Criminals will attempt to cover the 
traces of their malicious work by using antifo-
rensic methods to manipulate and tamper the 
evidence or interfere directly with the process 
(Harris, 2006). 
Antiforensics is the terminology used to 
define the activities of hackers or other cyber 
criminals aiming to undermine or mislead a 
computer forensic investigation. There are 
no well-established definitions regarding this 
discipline since it is quite new and it is yet 
to be explored. Peron and Legary define it as 
‘four categories of evidence destruction, evi-
dence source elimination, evidence hiding and 
evidence counterfeiting’ (Harris, 2006), while 
Grugq (Ruxcon, 2004) defines antiforensics as 
‘[the attempt] to limit the quantity and quality 
of forensic evidence.’
Although antiforensics is a field under 
development, however, there are already 
categories of available tools. Grugq seems to 
be one of the most dedicated antiforensic re-
searchers so far. With more than five years of 
antiforensic studies, he ended up losing his job 
after publishing Art of Defiling: Anti-Forensics 
(Ruxcon, 2004). 
The Metasploit Anti-Forensic project by 
Vincent Liu is part of the Metasploit project 
which targets audiences interested in penetration 
testing. Liu’s presentation titled ‘Bleeding-Edge 
Anti-Forensics’ which was copresented with 
Francis Brown for an Infosec World Conference 
was the most descriptive work of what he did 
so far about antiforensics. 
There are number of techniques that are 
used to apply antiforensics. These techniques 
are not necessarily designed with antiforensics 
dimension in mind. For instance, folder shielders 
have been designed in order to primarily provide 
a level of security and privacy, but they can be 
used as an antiforensic tool since they can hide 
data (Jahankhani, Anastasios, & Revett, 2007). 
The others are:
• Digital media wiping: A proper wiping of 
the media that contains the digital evidence; 
will simply make the evidence disappear.
• Steganography: Someone can use steg-
anography to hide a file inside another 
and make the investigator unable to take 
advantage of the evidence.
• Privacy wipers: These are tools that aim 
to delete any privacy traces from operating 
systems, applications, or both. If properly 
used the investigator might find no evidence 
at all inside the digital media.
• Rootkits: Rootkits can subvert the operat-
ing system kernel and even react to forensic 
acquisition processes by hijacking the way 
the operating system uses areas like process 
management or memory management to 
extract the evidence.
• S.M.A.R.T antiforensics: This kind of 
technology can be used by an attacker to 
suspect if a hard drive has been taken out 
for a forensic duplication process.
• Homographic attacks: Such an attack can 
mislead an investigator since some letters 
that look similar to the human eye can be 
replaced with others in such a way to make 
a malicious file look legitimate.
• File signature modification attacks: 
Someone can purposefully change the file 
signature of a file to make it look something 
else.
• Encryption: This can be used almost in 
every antiforensic stage in order to obscure 
and make unreadable and unusable the 
evidence.
• Metadata antiforensics: Information 
about data (metadata) can be altered in 
order to hide user actions.
• Slack space antiforensics: Someone 
can hide malicious software in areas that 
operating system might not use, like slack 
space, because they might be considered 
as reserved or empty.
• Secure digest functions (MD4, MD5, etc.) 
Collision generation: Someone can alter 
a file and then use antiforensic software 
to make this file having the same MD4 or 
MD5 value like before the alteration, thus 
bypassing a forensic integrity check. 
• Digital memory antiforensics: There are 
programs that are able to hide processes or 
other evidence from memory.
• Misleading evidence: Someone can leave 
evidence in such a way to mislead the 
forensic investigation.
• Packers/binders: Someone can use such 
a program in order to transform a file by 
changing its structure, thus it can bypass 
security mechanisms that searches for 
malicious behaviour patterns inside files.
• Forensic tools vulnerabilities/exploits: 
There are already implementations avail-
able to show that some of the computer 
current forensic tools can be bypassed or 
exploited. 
• Resource waste: To purposefully leave 
traces in a big network in order to make 
the forensic investigator waste valuable 
resources and time.
• Forensic detection: Someone can install 
a mechanism to be triggered after any 
computer forensic-related presence.
• Anonymous actions: It includes every ac-
tion that can be done by a fake or unknown 
identity. The result from the investigator is 
to fail to trace back the malicious activi-
ties.
• Antiforensics in flushable devices: Some-
one can take advantage of devices that can 
be flashed (like PCI cards or BIOS) and 
install malicious code inside them, thus 
they can remain unnoticed.
The aim of this article is to present three of 
the current antiforensic approaches and focuses 
only on memory-based antiforensics known as 
antiforensic live CDs. Memory-based bootable 
live CDs are specially built Linux operating 
systems that boot directly from the CD drive 
into the random access memory (RAM) area. 
These packages do not load into the hard drive, 
change files, or alter other variables in the target 
system unless specified by the user. Live CDs 
are used mainly for penetration testing and 
other security related tasks and they include a 
variety of software packages used for antifo-
rensic purposes. 
aCtIng anonyMously
From a forensic scope, anonymity can be con-
sidered as a major antiforensic approach. Below 
are some of the tools that are used.
anonymous Mail accounts
These are accounts that are created using 
services available on the Internet that facili-
tate anonymous mailing. This will make the 
process of e-mail tracking more difficult as 
the mail headers are altered and no Internet 
protocol (IP) address details will be available 
(Greene, 2003).
Figure 1 shows that the sender is an 
anonymous authority, in this case the domain 
of ‘bananasplit.info.’ There is also an e-mail 
address (abuse@bananasplit.info; not visible 
in the picture) where more information about 
the sender’s IP could be requested by the fo-
rensics team. 
anonymous Proxies
Nowadays there are plenty of anonymous prox-
ies on the Internet with a significant number 
of them being free (Anonymous INET, 2006; 
Free Proxy, 2006). Although these proxies 
promise Internet anonymity, they do not always 
talk about the level of anonymity service they 
provide. 
Below is the result of a test on a high 
anonymity service in order to find out the 
amount of information on the user’s identity. 
The anonymity has been checked against a Web 
site (anonymitytest.com) that shows the IP ad-
dress of the visiting address along with a service 
(‘whois’) that aims to trace back the IP. 
It is important to note that in special cases 
even a high anonymity server can reveal all the 
information regarding its users. All someone 
has to do is to monitor and analyse the traffic 
patterns coming to and from that proxy (Gib-
son, 2006).
Figure 2 shows that high anonymity proxy 
puts its own IP number to the visited Web page 
in order to keep the client anonymous. 
An attempt to trace back the address will 
come up with the details of the proxy server 
and not the user’s figure below.
In order to get more information about the 
real visitor’s identity, the anonymous proxy 
provider has to be contacted. Here are the 
problems someone might face:
Figure 1. Anonymous mail details
1. There are cross boarder legal issues. In this 
case the domain ends with ‘br’ which means 
that the proxy owner is located somewhere 
in Brazil. 
2. The anonymous proxy provider—no matter 
the geographical location—might claim 
that all the logs are deleted and nothing is 
saved regarding their clients (anonymous 
visitors). In that case, only a government 
regulation which enforces IP logging would 
provide a connection to the client’s IPs.
It is important to note that someone can be 
a part of an anonymous network—like Tor—in 
order to achieve anonymity. In this case it is 
not feasible even for the governments to totally 
follow an IP or a packet, since the information 
is going through a variety of interconnected 
nodes with some encrypted links through several 
countries. This is a more efficient way to keep 
the users anonymous. 
The only way for someone to monitor an 
amount of Tor’s traffic is to set up a fake Tor 
server and monitor the traffic of some other 
Figure 2. Anonymity service
Figure 3. Proxy server details
servers as well. In a crackdown of a recent 
crime investigation in Germany, police seized 
10 Tor servers for suspicion of a child porn 
investigation (Oates, 2006).
wIreless antIforensICs 
Methods
How about if someone launches an attack using 
multiple access points from roof top of a high 
building in the middle of a crowded city with 
the help of a strong directional antenna? 
Raul Siles, in his excellent two-part article 
‘Wireless Forensics: Tapping the Air’ unveils 
some ‘de facto’ and some new wireless antifo-
rensics methods. Some of the major approaches 
are (Siles, 2006, 2007):
• The use of illegal channels, like channel 
14 in U.S. and Europe
• The use of strong layer-2 encryption
• The modification of the 802.11 specification 
(Raw Covert, madWifi patches)
• Wireless MAC spoofing 
While in theory the forensics investigator 
should monitor every single packet of every 
channel available around the suspect, in reality 
the post incident response could end up quite 
dramatically. This could be due to ignorance 
regarding the channels and access points used, 
legal barriers between the access point and the 
forensics acquisition, noncooperative ISPs, 
and so forth. The forensic process should be 
enhanced with security mechanisms which 
would upgrade the post-incident reaction to 
real time. The real-time acquisition tools should 
have capabilities of capturing activity of all the 
wireless point within a respectable distance. 
MeMory-Based BootaBle 
envIronMents
There are plenty of ‘live CDs’—commercial 
and freeware—in the market that are made to 
meet certain user’s needs. These are like data re-
covery (SystemRescueCD, ERD Commander), 
security (BackTrack, NST), PC benchmarking 
(StressLinux, Ultimate CD), gaming (LLGP, 
Freeduc-games), or even alternatives for a 
fully functional operating system (Knoppix, 
Kanotix). There is also a Web site called Frozen 
Tech (2006) that lists a vast majority of the live 
CDs (if not all of them) (Brand, 2006)
A live CD is nothing more than a compact 
disk, DVD, or USB drive which contain an 
operating system image file and a boot loader 
program, used to start or boot a computer sys-
tem. An image file is a single compressed file 
that contains the entire operating system pro-
grams and files. Bootable CDs, also known as 
LiveDistros, are mostly available freely open 
source license agreement. According to this 
agreement ‘anyone can modify and redistribute 
the original operating system without asking 
for permission of retribution from the author’ 
(Opensource.org, 2007). 
The concept behind using removable media 
for storing operating systems is not new. In the 
early introduction of personal computers, oper-
ating systems (such as MS-DOS) were loaded 
into the memory from removable media (usually 
floppy disks). With the advent of mainframes 
(considered the first generation of computer sys-
tems), the instructions to hardware components 
were given by punched cards, which although 
did not constitute an operating system in per 
se, did introduce the concept of OS. It is worth 
mentioning though that punched cards were not 
effective as live CDs since extensive processes 
required hundreds of them (Gochioco, 2004).
Mainframes were not the only computer 
systems that used removable media for storing 
instruction programs or operating systems. For 
example, diskless computer systems do not have 
operating systems installed; instead they load 
from a copy of the operating system located in 
a network server. Either operating systems such 
as MINIX are distributed mainly in removable 
media (i.e., CD, floppy, etc.) because of its 
extremely small size; MINIX kernel counts 
only 4000 program lines whereas other operat-
ing systems rely on millions of lines of code 
(Minix, 2007).
Although live CDs are the preferred tools 
of trade in conducting memory-based antiforen-
sics, most of them were designed for security 
testing purposes. Good collections of security 
testing tools are distributed with these portable 
media and are usually used by computer security 
professionals to troubleshoot their computer 
systems and networks. Unfortunately, even 
malicious users are making use of these specially 
build packages to perform illegal activities, 
amongst all antiforensics.
The majority of memory-based packages 
used for antiforensic purposes are built on UNIX 
oriented platforms, although there are similar 
packages built on platforms such as Windows, 
Apple MAC, MS-DOS, MINIX, and so forth.. 
There is a reason behind this. Most of UNIX 
operating system platforms are built on open 
source code (nonproprietary) and for this reason 
a lot of security focused tools are developed and 
distributed online. UNIX systems are also the 
platform of choice for security specialists and 
hackers because of their reliability, flexibility, 
and amount of accessible security tools. Typi-
cally, the graphical user interface (GUI) of a 
live CD is either a KDE or gnome interface. 
These are the most popular user interfaces in 
UNIX platforms.
Live CDs manage to recognise and work 
with a variety of hardware components thanks 
to its device manager called ‘udev’ (Qlogic.com, 
2007), which is the device manger for most of 
UNIX/LINUX based systems. Device manag-
ers are programs designed to handle hardware 
components of a computer system. Having 
a device manager that interacts with most of 
hardware devices promotes the interoperability 
and portability of LiveDistros. All the remov-
able media attached to the system are viewable 
from the LiveDistros interface.
The OS loaded from the live CD can view, 
access, or copy all the files and programs created 
by the native operating system (these are stored 
in the secondary memory area). Linux-based 
operating systems treat all attached devices as 
files. When the live CD start running it checks 
for hard drives, removable media, and other 
devices attached to the motherboard. When 
found, these devices are mounted (connected) 
to the operating system; at shut down the con-
nection is dropped. Hard disks contents are 
viewable, can be copied, but no alterations can 
be made to files from the live CD interface. 
From a malicious user point of view, this is a 
good opportunity to explore, since information 
in the native hard disk can be accessed easily 
without leaving traces. Most of the operating 
systems run security services which keep re-
cords of users or systems that access its files. 
However, since these systems are not running, 
no records will be added to the log files of the 
native OS.
Furthermore, important system files can 
be copied, scrutinised, and important data 
disclosed. For example, in Windows platforms 
‘SAM’ file is the recipient of system passwords. 
These passwords are encrypted, but if copied 
and then attacked, systems passwords can be 
identified. Live CDs provide the necessary tools 
to unveil the encrypted passwords copied from 
the hard disk (e.g., Kain, John the Ripper), com-
promising seriously the security of the system. 
From the interface of the live CD, the native 
OS security files such as ‘SAM’ can be copied 
and saved in ramdisk or in a removable device 
to be attacked at a later stage. A fully detailed 
demonstration of this attacking technique will 
be provided in the next article.
Network services are fully accessible from 
the live CD interface. Connections to Internet or 
local computer systems are easily implemented 
permitting the user to perform most of the tasks 
available in operating systems that run from 
the hard disk. 
Memo-based antiforensics techniques 
are difficult to beat for a variety of reasons. 
The most important advantages of using these 
techniques are: 
1. Lack of digital evidence 
2. Compatibility, flexibility, and portability
3. Anonymity 
4. Availability of tools
5. Freely distributed
SecurityDistro.com, a site dedicated to 
memory-based security tools, lists over 40 
memory-based packages (Securitydistro.com, 
2007). Most of the packages offer similar tools 
and interfaces. Among these packages are 
Backtrack, Anonym.OS, Helix, Penguin Sleuth, 
and Auditor collection which have a wide range 
of security tools that might be used to deploy 
antiforensic activities. 
In this article, Backtrack antiforensic 
tools were used, which are freely available. 
The selection is not casual. Backtrack does 
provide the user with the opportunity to use a 
well-established security focused framework, 
metasploit (Metasploit.com, 2007). Metasploit 
framework is a collection of security tools used 
to test the security side of computer systems, 
penetration testing, and exploitation. 
Furthermore, metasploit contains a special 
module called antiforensics, which is a collec-
tion of antiforensic tools (e.g., timestomp, sam 
juicer, slacker, transmogrify, etc.) that can be 
loaded and used directly from the live CD. 
According to Vinnie Liu, a well known 
antiforensic researcher, these tools are designed 
to tamper with or break well recognised indus-
try tools such as Encase, new file technology 
system (NTFS), and PGP desktop, with the final 
objective of manipulating the digital evidence 
and compromising the investigation findings 
(Liu & Stach, 2007).
Once Backtrack is downloaded, the Linux 
based operating systems can be burned in a 
bootable CD and be ready for use. Instructions 
on how to accomplish this task are available on 
various sites online. 
stealing Passwords
Backtrack live CD can be used by malicious 
users to steal and then crack passwords used to 
log in computer systems. Windows operating 
systems store password information locally in 
the hard drive in a system file called security 
accounts manager, otherwise known as SAM 
file. 
This file is very important from the security 
point of view since it contains all system user 
passwords in an encrypted format. Encryption of 
user passwords is performed by Windows using 
a proprietary encryption utility called system 
key which uses ‘strong encryption techniques 
to secure account password information that is 
stored in the SAM file.’ In a computer system 
running Windows OS, the system key utility 
(program) is located at this logical address: C: 
/Windows/system32/config/system. The system 
key program also contains the key used to en-
crypt the passwords stored in SAM.
Usually access to SAM is restricted since 
it is a system file. Even if the user manages to 
copy SAM in a portable media device it will be 
difficult to unmask the hidden passwords since 
a key stored in the system utility is needed to 
decrypt SAM. The key must be extracted first 
from the system key utility. However with 
Backtrack, a user can extract quite easily user 
passwords stored in SAM, without creating 
digital evidence. By using Backtrack no digital 
evidence is left since all the operations are per-
formed in RAM and at the same time no digital 
evidence will be left in the native Windows 
system since it is not running.
Backtrack can be also used to recover user 
account passwords of a remote computer system 
running Windows OS. In this case metasploit 
frame work might be used to achieve the goal. 
A metasploit ‘exploit’ called lsass_ms041_011 
is used to connect remotely to vulnerable com-
puter systems. Once a connection is established 
remotely an advanced metasploit package 
called ‘meterpreter’ is used to fully explore to 
the target system. 
The meterpreter is a sophisticated software 
package shipped with metasploit that facilitates 
attack automation, by making it easy to interact 
with processes, networking, and the file system 
(Metasploit.com, 2007). Furthermore, another 
special module of meterpreter called Sam juicer 
can be used to copy password hashed from SAM. 
Sam juicer performs the task without accessing 
SAM file, the registry, or writing any files in 
the remote computer system hard disk. This 
is achieved through an advanced connection 
technique called direct memory injection; no 
digital evidence is created or left in the target 
computer system (Liu & Stach, 2007).
This technique undermines completely the 
investigation process because no digital evi-
dence is created in the remote computer system 
since the communication between computers is 
conducted in the temporary memory (RAM). 
Files are not accessed directly, new processes 
are not created or data added to the log (se-
curity monitoring) files. A computer forensic 
investigator will not be able to gather digital 
evidence from neither of the computer systems 
(the attacker’s or the attacked system) simply 
because the evidence does not exist. 
Modifying timestamps
From a computer forensic investigation point 
of view file timestamps are very important 
because they provide the necessary evidence 
to prove if certain antiforensic activities oc-
curred at a certain moment in time or whether 
a user was logged in a computer system. For 
this reason malicious users might attempt to 
modify timestamps in order to eliminate com-
promising evidence. A timestamp is the data 
appended to a file that shows when a file is 
created, accessed, modified, or entry modified. 
These file attributes are also known as modi-
fied-accessed-created-entry modified (MACE) 
attributes. Antiforensic tools attempt to modify 
these data parameters in order to mislead com-
puter forensic investigators.
Backtrack again provides the perfect 
tool to modify timestamps. The tool is called 
timestomp and is included in the metasploit 
framework. Timestomp is a program developed 
by metasploit project which gives the user the 
opportunity to modify all NTFS timestamp 
parameters (Metasploit.com, 2007). NTFS is 
the proprietary file system of modern Windows 
operating systems including NT, 2000, 2003, 
XP, and Vista (NTFS, 2007).
Timestomp can be used also as a stand-
alone program to modify timestamps; how-
ever its potential is fully explored when used 
within the metasploit framework. Meterpreter 
module (started from backtrack) permits a 
user to connect remotely to a target computer 
system. On the other hand from within this 
module timestomp can be executed to modify 
file timestamps. Since all the operations are 
conducted in temporary memory (RAM) no 
digital evidence is left in the systems to indicate 
traces of antiforensic activity. Certainly it will 
almost be impossible for a computer forensic 
investigator to notice timestamp modification 
since its parameters will look legitimate.
Hiding Data in Slack Space
Slack space is the preferred hard disk area used 
by a malicious user for storing illegal software, 
documents, or pictures because files stored in it 
are not seen or accessed by windows explorer; 
‘data is hidden in unallocated or unreachable 
locations that are ignored by the current gen-
eration of forensic tools’ (Forensicwiki.org, 
2007). The user is completely unaware of the 
existence of such files.
A variety of malicious programs might be 
used to hide data in the slack space; however 
‘slacker’ is one the most proficient tools used to 
perform such activities. Slacker, which is named 
after the slack space, was developed by the 
metasploit team and was released as a module 
with metasploit framework (Metasploit.com, 
2007). Slacker uses a sophisticated technique to 
hide programs, files, or any other type of data in 
the slack space. It takes the data, fragments them 
into thousands of pieces, and then distributes 
them across the slack space in the hard disk. 
This program mainly stores the data in stable file 
such as system files (windows/system32 files) 
which are not examined also buy computer fo-
rensic tools. Slacker’s main features include file 
splitting and slack space hiding; these features 
make slacker very hard to trace.
If a computer forensic tool is used to analyse 
the data in the slack space, no evidence will 
be discovered since individual fragments of 
data will not help to construct the true nature 
of the hidden file; for the forensic tool data 
are so diffuse that they look like random noise 
(Berinato, 2007). Only Slacker can recompose 
the fragmented pieces of data to create the 
original file. Slacker has proven to be successful 
also against PGP desktop, a security tools that 
includes some tools claming to wipe out com-
pletely the slack space. Metasploit researcher 
Vinnie Liu has proven that data written in the 
slack space with slacker can not be wiped out 
even when PGP desktop tool is used (Metasploit.
com, 2007).
Modifying File Extensions and 
Signatures
In a computer, system files are identified by two 
attributes: file extensions and file signatures. For 
each file format there is a unique file signature; 
for example executable files in Windows are 
identified by file signatures starting with the 
letters MZ (Liu & Stach, 2006). Therefore, 
to hide a file in a computer system suffices to 
change its extension and add the letters MZ at 
the beginning of that file. By using this tech-
nique files containing pornographic material for 
example can be masqueraded as system files and 
go undetected by computer forensic tools.
Memory-based antiforensic tools such as 
Backtrack can be used effectively to manipu-
late file extension and signatures. Metasploit 
project has developed and is about to release 
a tool called Transmogrify that allows a user 
to masquerade malicious files. Metasploit 
developers claim that this tool is able to alter 
file extension and header/signature without 
being detected by forensic tools like Encase 
(Metasploit.com, 2007). 
Meterpreter loads remote processes (such 
as cmd.exe) in memory, therefore no digital 
evidence will be left in the system .To make 
things harder for computer forensic investiga-
tors, the MACE attributes of wufileuel.sys can 
be further altered to match the attributes of other 
system files. Forensic tools will not be able to 
identify the malicious file since file extension, 
signature, and timestamps look legitimate, and 
therefore no red flags will be raised.
CrItICal dIsCussIon 
and evaluatIon of 
the MeMory-Based 
antIforensIC tools 
and teChnIques
Memory-based antiforensic tools and tech-
niques interfere substantially with the inves-
tigation process by altering or hiding digital 
evidence. Because memory-based antiforensics 
techniques are deployed directly in temporary 
memory (RAM), the defence strategies must 
be focused at this memory area. Slack space 
must be scrutinised and analysed as well. These 
defensive strategies must be implemented to 
achieve some sort of success against memory-
based antiforensic activities: 
a. Slack space analysis: Statistical analysis of 
slack space must be conducted to discover 
strange or unusual samples of data (Liu & 
Stach, 2006). For example, Slacker splits 
and distributes file fragments usually across 
a vast range of system files. For this reason 
it would be wise to scrutinise carefully the 
slack space of these files in order to trace 
potential antiforensic activity, even though 
it will be difficult to reconstruct the original 
hidden data. According to Vinnie Liu, file 
fragments in slack space and file system 
information must be analysed together in 
order to discover elements of slack space 
antiforensics (Liu & Stach, 2006).
b. Capture data in memory: Memory-based 
live CDs load, operate, and store data in 
memory, unless specified otherwise by 
the user. For this reason the main area to 
look for digital evidence is the memory of 
the local or remote computer system used 
for antiforensic activities. Other data that 
should be captured are running processes, 
ports, and uploaded or downloaded files 
which will indicate if such activities oc-
curred. 
Memory-based antiforensics relies mainly 
on volatile memory, while traditional antiforen-
sics is deployed in the secondary memory stor-
age area (hard disk). For this reason memory-
based live CD activities are hard to detect since 
volatile memory is unstable and easy to erase. 
Computer forensic investigators might be able to 
collect digital evidence only if the perpetrator’s 
computer device is seized and is not shut down; 
however if the user has removed the live CD 
and turned off the system, the evidence is lost 
permanently since memory is volatile. Forensic 
tools such as Memparser (SourceForge, 2007) 
or Windows memory forensic toolkit (WFTK, 
2007) might be used to collect valuable data 
in memory.
c. Improving Computer forensic tools: 
Some memory-based antiforensic tools 
(e.g., Timestomp, Transmogrify) tackle 
computer forensic packages. Timestomp 
provides a specific option to trick Encase; 
by using switch –b, timestamps are set to 
blank. Encase and forensic tool kit (FTK), 
two prestigious computer forensic tools, do 
not recognise Timestomp changes (Liu & 
Stach, 2006). This is a clear indication that 
these tools must be improved (or rewrit-
ten) in order to properly detect timestamp 
alterations, particularly because modified 
timestamps can compromise the success 
of a computer forensic case in the court of 
law. On the other hand Encase and FTK 
do not detect file extension or signature 
modification achieved with Transmogrify 
or Backtrack; even in this case these tools 
must be improved in order to detect traces 
of antiforensic activity. Computer forensic 
tool designers should examine carefully 
how memory-based live CDs interact with 
the system in order to improve their future 
released tools; the idea behind this is to 
use the same antiforensic tools to defeat 
them.
d. Improving signature analysis: Memory-
based antiforensic tools manage to 
modify file extensions and signatures. 
In the meantime some of the most used 
computer forensic tools (i.e., Encase, FTK 
etc.) fail to detect such changes. Encase 
checks only the first two characters of a 
file signature which can be easily modified 
(e.g., MZ for executable files). Therefore, 
automated tools will not be able to detect 
file signature modifications achieved by 
using memory-based antiforensic tools. In 
this case manual investigation should be 
conducted provided that the investigator 
identifies the suspicious files. Forensic tools 
need to be redesigned to tackle file signature 
modification. A good way forward would 
be the redesign of the searching process so 
that files are checked from top to bottom for 
patterns of data. This method might produce 
good results since particular patterns of data 
might be associated with certain files; if 
these patterns are not present then further 
investigation can be conducted. 
e. Invest in human and time resources: If 
digital evidence is well hidden there is a 
high probability that it will go undetected 
because of feasibility issues. This is true 
especially when there are thresholds to meet 
in terms of time and cost (e.g., pressure to 
complete a forensic investigation within 
a deadline). In the case of memory-based 
antiforensics, digital evidence is hard to 
recover because it is well hidden. Therefore 
more training and time must be provided 
to investigators so they can succeed. Fi-
nancial resources must also be committed 
to develop efficient forensic tools in short 
periods of space in order to keep up to date 
with antiforensic tool development. 
Another issue to consider seriously is the 
way computer forensic investigators process 
seized data. Computer forensic cases are usu-
ally based on evidence produced by automated 
tools such as Encase or FTP. Unfortunately these 
tools do not detect most of antiforensic activi-
ties deployed by live CDs. The solution to this 
problem is a combination of in depth manual 
investigation and automated tool searching since 
manual processing might be able to reveal some 
of the digital evidence traces. 
ConClusIons
Antiforensics is a reality that comes with every 
serious crime and involves tactics for ‘safe 
hacking’ and keeps the crime sophistication in 
a high level. Computer forensic investigators 
along with the forensic software developers 
should start paying more attention to antifo-
rensics tools and approaches. 
If we consider computer forensics as the 
actions of collection, preservation, identifica-
tion, and presentation of evidence, antiforensics 
can affect the first three stages. Because these 
stages can be characterised as ‘finish to start’ 
between them from a project management 
point of view, the failure of one of them could 
end up as a failure of the lot. Thus, there is a 
high impact of antiforensics to the forensics 
investigations.
Officially there is no such thing as antifo-
rensic investigations because the antiforensic 
countermeasures are still part of the investiga-
tor’s skills.
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